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THE CASE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
HARRY SHULMAN* 
The lawyer's task in this symposium is simple and unhappy. He need not spec· 
ulate about the effects of the Social Security Act on life, on business, on government. 
He need not concern himself about the probabilities of expec.ted benefits or suggested 
evils." Those thrilling jobs have been assigned exclusively to other contributors. 
Moreover, constitutional dogma teach~s that, in his professional capacity 'of advising 
on constitutionality, the lawyer, as the judge, need not even persuade himself of the 
wisdom or folly, the desirability or undesirability, of the legislation-not even that 
the legislation is perhaps a little more wise than foolish or a little more foolish than 
wise. It is sufficient if the legislative determination has some reasonable support. 
The work of the Committee on Economic Security, the legislative hearings and the 
remainder of this symposium establish that support-and beyond peradventure. So 
the lawyer's job is simple: "to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked 
beside the statute which is challenged" and, "uninfluenced by predilection for or 
against the policy disclosed in the legislation," see "whether the latter squares with 
the ·former .• "1 
Observers of the Supreme Court's work tell us, however, that the lawyer's job is 
not so mechanical. He must determine not whether the legislation squares with the 
Constitution but rather how the tribunal having the power of ultimate decision will 
decide. When the Supreme Court is that tribunal, he must guess what at least five 
of the nine Justices will decide. Their decision, he is told, may be influenr~-1 by 
conscious or subconscious predilections, by earlier conditioning and by psychologicaf 
factors of varying degrees of unpredictability. And certainly, decision involves either 
intelligent comprehension or mistaken distortion of the problems with which the 
legislation deals, ~e difficulties which they present, the manner in which the legis· 
lation deals with them and the problems of choice which were resolved by the ado~ 
tion of' that method. The lawyer's job, then, involves all the speculation and uncer· 
• A.B., 1923, Brown University; LL.B., 1926, S.J.D., 1927, Harvard University. Member of the New 
York and Rhode Island Bars. Associate ProfeSsor of Law, Yale University School of Law. Special Counsel, 
Railroad Retireq~ent Board. Law clerk to Mr.· Justice Brandeis, United States Supreme Court, 1929-1930, 
Contributor to legal periodicals. 
1 U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 318, 325 (1936); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 
u. s. 330, 346 (1935). 
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tainty inherent in economic or social forecasting. Yet, the economist or sociologist 
is rarely proved to his own satisfaction completely, or even partly, wrong. He can 
lay non-realization of his prophecy, not to his error, but to the intervention of other 
factors; or he can urge that conditions would have been still better or worse had 
his suggestions been followed or rejected. But the lawyer has no such solace. When 
the Supreme Court has decided, his prediction was either right or wrong, and beyond 
cavil-unless, indeed, he can find comfort in the thought, expressed by a distin-
guished veteran of the bar, "the Supreme Court may not accept these views, but I 
regard them as sound." 
Moreover, the recent T.V .A. decision reminds, at an opportune time, that it is 
not constitutional to pass on constitutionality in the abstract. Judical decision must 
be rendered only with respect to specific issues raised by specific parties having 
specific interest in a specific case within judicial cognizance. No court is empowered 
by the Constitution to render opinions on the constitutionality of legislation: The 
Supreme Court's power, like that of the inferior federal courts, is only that of decid-
ing cases or controversies appropriate for the exercise of. the federal judicial power. 
In adjudicating such cases the Court may find it imperative to disregard legislation 
because it conflicts with the Constitution. But beyond yielding to this imperative 
necessity, as encountered and only to the extent encountered in cases before it, the 
Court may not inquire into the constitutionality of congressionallegislation.2 This 
theory need not be idle liturgy. It should have substantial· practical significance. 
For, since neither the Constitution nor constitutional theory sets up the judiciary 
as a third branch of the government to advise on constitutionality and since neither 
the Constitution nor constitutional theory creates cases or controversies through 
which constitutionality is to be determined by the judiciary, some legislation, a least, 
may be beyond the scope of judicial review on this orthodox theory. In such cases, 
determination of constitutionality rests with the other branches of the· government; 
and the enactment of the legislation is conclusive of its constitutionality until there 
is a change of mind in those branches. An outstanding feature of the recent work 
of the Supreme Court has been the expansion of the area in which it exercises 
power.3 But that expansion, like other constitutio~al determinations, has divided 
the Court and is subject to the possibilities of the future. There is still vitality in 
the orthodox theory and it has considerable significance in discussions of the consti-
tutionality of the Social Security Act. 
2 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936). Both major opinions profess this 
dogma and both are limited in deference to it, though in different ways. The opinion of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis refuses to deal at all with the constitutionality of T.V.A.; and the opinion of the Chief Justice 
deals with the problem only as related to the Wilson Dam. 
8 E.g., U.S. v. Constantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (1935); Colgate v. Harvey, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935); U.S. 
v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936); Rickert Rice Mills, Inc. v. Fontenot, 56 Sup. Ct. 249, 374 (1936); Gt. 
No. Ry. v. Weeks, 56 Sup. Ct. 426 (1936); Ashwander v. T.V.A., 56 Sup. Ct. 466 (1936); see Collier, 
Judicial Bootstraps and the General Welfarr: Clause (1936) 4 GE:o. WASH. L. REv. 211, 217. 
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TITLES I, III, IV, v, VI, X 
These titles, which respectively envisage grants to the states for old-age assistance, 
unemployment compensation administration, aid to dependent children, maternal 
and child welfare, public health work, and aid to the blind, may be considered 
together.4 None operates on individuals. None requires action from individuals. 
All merely provide for federal grants of money to the states, which the states may 
take or reject,, to aid the states in their performance of the named objects. Some 
limit the amount of the federal grant to a percentage of the total to be expended by 
the states and condition the grant upon financial participation by the states. Others 
make outright grants not conditioned upon any state financial participation. All 
impose conditions upon the administration and expenditure of the funds. 
Unl<;5s the Supreme Court turns its back on a century of constitutionalism and 
the judicial power is expanded beyond even its present wide borders, these grants-
in-aid are constitutional so l~ng as Congress deems them so. For, while similar 
grants-in-aid have been common in our history, the Supreme Court has expressly 
disclaimed power to review their constitutionality. In Frothingham v. Mellon and 
in Massachusetts v. Mellon 5 the Court held that neither a general taxpayer nor the 
state had a standing to question the appropriations under the Sheppard-Towner 
Maternity Act. 6 Whether the taxpayer pays small or huge taxes is immaterial, as 
indicated in the opinion of the Chief Justice in the T.V.A. case.7 The point is that 
the taxpayer's money is collected for the general use o£ the government and is not 
earmark-ed for a particular purpose or specifically imposed to recompense for par-
ticular expenditures.8 Unlike the processing taxes of the A.A.A., Mrs. Frothing-
ham's taxes were not special taxes imposed in connection with the special scheme 
of expenditures. The processors were successful in their challenge of the A.A.A. 
taxes because the Court regarded that Act as "one regulating agricultural produc-
tion" with the tax "a mere incident of the regulation" and an "exaction" from the 
processors for bestowal upon the farmers. But the authority of the Maternity cases 
'In conversation Title III is commonly linked with Title IX. Naturally, since both relate to unem-
ployment compensation. But for the purpose of inquiring into their constitutionality there is little 
justification for linking the two titles together. It can hardly pe said that the Title IX tax is imposed for 
the· purpose of balancing the Title III appropriation. If the purpose of both titles is to encourage state 
unemployment compensation plans, nevertheless they are not integral parts of a single scheme; each holds 
forth a separate inducement. Since they are separate titles and since there is not even a budgetary relation 
between them-and particularly in view of the separability clause-the constitutionality of each may be 
considered independently of the other. The validity of Title IX will be considered presently. If that title 
is deemed valid, when considered by itself, it seems inconceivable that its legality is affected by Title III. 
Conversely, if that title is held invalid, when considered by itself, Title III cannot alter the judgment, but 
likewise, Title III need not automatically suffer the same fate. 
6 262 U.S. 447 (1923). • 42 SrAr. 224 (1921). 
1 56 Sup. Ct. at 470: "While their stock holdings arc small, they have a real interest. • • • If other-
wise entitled, they should not be denied the relief which would be accorded to one who owned more 
shares." 
8 With respect to the state's suit, there was the additional ground that, since "nothing has been done 
and nothing is to be done" under the statute without tlie states' consent, "it is plain that the question, as 
it is thus presented, is political and not judicial in character, and therefore is not a matter which admits 
of the exercise o£ the judicial power." · 262 U. S. 447 at 483. 
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was expressly saved.9 It seems unlikely that the Court will dub the past practice a 
"century of error" and undertake to review general government expenditures at the 
suit of a general taxpayer or a state. 
The grants-in-aid of the Social Security Act are quite like those of the Maternity 
Act. Both acts provide fqr appropriations from general funds in the Treasury. 
Neither requires or contemplates special taxes to balance the expenditures. Indeed, 
Title V provides federal expenditures for the very same purposes as the Maternity 
Act, and Part 4 of Title V implements the Vocational Rehabilitation Act previously 
in force. The objec;:ts of the other. grants are of the same character as maternal 
welfare. On the issue whether federal expenditures for their welfare are subject to 
judicial review, constitutional law does not differentiate betwe~n child-bearing 
mothers and the blind, the aged, or the crippled children; nor is public health service 
or the administration of unemployment compensation on a different constitutional 
plane.10 
If there is no procedure whereby these grants ron be subjected to judicial review, 
then Congress, not the Court, is the ultimate judge of their constitutionality. And 
if the issue of constitutionality should be raised in Congress, the argument for validity 
is quite convincing. A century of practice and an abundance of persuasive precedent 
are alone weighty considerations. The appropriations are for the "general welfare" 
in any intelligible meaning of that phrase. They operate throughout the nation to 
aid the states in relieving distress common in all of them, common, that is, in the 
nation and directly affecting the national welfare. The states' need of federal aid 
in providing for this relief is the outstanding lesson of our current history and is 
conceded by all shades of political belief. The expenditures are administered by the 
states. They involve no element of regulation or coercion of the kind found by the 
Court in the A.A.A. or of any kind. The federal government is not superseding the 
state or invading its powers, but on the contrary is aiding it and strengthening its 
efforts. 
But even a more limited' interpretation of general welfare would include the 
national interest in the nation's man-power in connection with its responsibilities 
for war and interstate and foreign commerce. The relationship of public health 
service and child and maternal welfare on a national scale to the maintenance of 
that man-power is qu~te clear. No less is the nation's concern with the effect on its 
man-power of the distress of the aged and unemployed when that distress becomes 
a national phenomenon. The argumen1: is not that under its interstate commerce 
or war powers, the Congress can enact any legislation which would affect the objects 
of those powers, but rather that the nation's interest in war and commerce is relevant 
in determining whether the general warfare is promoted by an exercise of the inde-
• 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 315-17. 
10 Part C, pp. 61-69, of the Appendix to the Brief for the United States in the A.A.A. case contains a 
collection of many previous grants in aid. See also Horack, Federal-State Cooperation for Social Security: 
Tile Grant-in-Aid (1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 292. 
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pendent power of appropriation. Whether or not the nation may regulate industry 
or individu~l conduct to prevent such distress, an unencumbered appropriation of 
money to be e~pended by the states for such relief-expenditures calculated to pro-
mote stability in purchasing power, to foster physical health, and to avoid starvation 
or demo'ralization throughout the population-is surely for the general welfare even 
when that phrase is narrowed in meaning. 
"The aged" should not be given a literal meaning which would distort the pur-
pose of the Act. The term refers not so much to a category of persons as to a type 
of social maladjustment affecting the population generally. Aged persons are not 
a group detached from persons as a whole. They are bound to the rest of the pop· 
ulation by family and economic ties which prevent segregation or isolation. The 
support of aged persons casts a heavy burden on their younger relatives. Suffering 
or demoralization among the aged means also suffering and demoralization among 
the younger members of their families. Relief for the aged is relief, moral and · 
economic, for the young-relief for the population generally. "The aged" describes, 
not the beneficiaries of the legislation, but the medium through which the general 
welfare is sought to be promoted. 
It may be suggested that the grants are in fact encumbered by conditions which 
make a difference;-<:onditions requiring financial participation by the states, state-
~ide operation of the state plans, reports to the Social Security Board, administration 
or supervision by a single. state agency and with approved methods, fair hearings for 
aggrieved individuals and avoidance of unapproved residence or citizenship require-
ments. But similar conditions commonly encumbered grants-in-aid made in the 
past.11 All of them relate solely to the administration and expenditure of the funds 
appropriated. None of them requires -conduct unrelated to the expenditure. All are 
prudent safeguards dictated by experience to insure economical rather than wasteful 
expenditure of the funds, by agencies financially interested rather than agencies 
dealing only with "other people's money," for the objects stated rather than for 
wasteful administration, openly and under public scrutiny rather than in official 
secrecy, for the national welfare rather than for local or individual preferment. 
None of these conditions has any resemblance to those condemned in the A.A.A. 
case. It would be the absence of such prudential conditions, rather than their 
presence, which might condemn the Act. 
TITLE VIII 
The power of Congress to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to 
pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United 
n E.g., the Maternity Act required state. participation, a state agency, reports by the state agency to the 
Federal Children's Bureau, approval of state plans by the federal board, and prohibition in the stale plan~ 
against taking children over parents' objections; it prohibited the use of the grant for the purchase, 
erection or repair of buildings or equipment and required that the money appropriated by the states be 
not used for the payment "of any maternity or infancy pension, stipend, or gratuity"; and it authorized 
the withholding of the federal funds upon a finding that the state agency "has not properly expended the 
money paid to it or the moneys herein required to be appropriated by such State." 42 STAT, 224•26, 
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States"12 has few limitations in the Constitution. There is first the limitation in 
that very grant of power; and there is the further provision in the same section that 
"all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Sec-
tion 9 of Article I also provides that "no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid 
unless in proportion to the census or enumeration ... ;" and this prohibition is 
modified by the Sixteenth Amendment which authorizes "taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states and with-
out regard to ~ny census or enumeration." To these limitations of the Constitution 
must be added those of the judicial gloss, 13 that the tax must be really a tax and 
not a penalty for conduct which Congress may not otherwise penalize, 14 that it 
must be a true tax rather than a disguise .for, or an integral part of, a scheme of 
regulation which Congress may not enact direct)y, 15 that it must be a tax rather 
than an exaction so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a deprivation of property 
without due process of law.16 
The immediate purpose of the taxes imposed by Title VIII is unquestionably to 
raise revenue. They are, therefore, not subject to the weakness of the ta."<es con-
demned in the Child Labor Tax Case11 or Hill v. Wallace.18 In those cases, the 
ta."<es were regarded as penalties or regulations because the government obviously 
did not desire revenue to result from their imposition. The taxes were imposed for 
prescribed conduct which it was clearly hoped would be abandoned under their 
compulsion. But it is even clearer that Title VIII is not intended to discourage 
employment, that its success depends upon the production of revenue rather than 
avoidance of the tax by abandonment of stated conduct. The taxes are not penalties. 
Likewise, neither Title VIII nor the remainder of the Act attempts to regulate the 
conduct of the ta."<payers, or of any other individuals,"beyond requiring them to pay 
the taxes and make the returns incident to tax collection. The taxes are consequently 
not regulations, unless the possible expenditures work a conversion, but that issue 
may be postponed for the moment. 
The subjects of the tax seem to be clearly within the limits of the constitutional 
grant of power to levy "taxes, duties, imports and excises." It is needless to deter-
mine what the nature of the tax is, for it certainly falls within one of the four desig-
nations. The choice of subjects is unlimited except by the uniformity and appor-
tionment provisions and, perhaps, by the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The uniformity clause requires only geographical uniformity, that is, opera-
lllu. S. CoNST., fulT. I, §8, 
15 For full analysis of that gloss,- see Powdl, Child Labor, Congress, and the Constitution (I922) I 
N.C. L. REv. 6I; Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Fedaal Taxation (I933) 18 MINN. 
L. REv. 757· 
"Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (I922); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (I922); U.S. v. Con-
stantine, 56 Sup. Ct. 223 (I935). 
lllu. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 3I2 (1935). 
'"Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928); Heiner 
v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932). 
11 Supra note 14. 18 Supra note 14. 
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tion throughout the United States.19 Title VIII does so operate. The apportion-
ment provision is applicable only to capitation and other "direct"" taxes. Title VIII 
levies neither kind. The taxes are not on the ownership of property or the income 
from property so as to fall under the ban of unapportioned "direct" taxes.20 The 
employer's tax refers to his employment of individuals, regardless of whether or not 
he has property or income from property. The employee's tax is levied on his in-
come not from property but from personal service, a subject available for taxation 
without apportionment even before the Sixteenth Amendment.21 Employment o£ 
others and the derivation of income from personal labor ar~ readily ascertainable 
"'-economic functions and are, therefore, ~ithin the range of subjects available for 
- federal taxation. 
The selection of employment and wages for taxation can hardly offend the due 
process clause so as to render the tax in fact an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
There is no requirement that the saJ:l!e taxes be levied on all persons in .the country. 
Congress, like the legislatures of all other governments, has made special selections 
throughout our entire history as a nation. Manufacture of tobacco and liquors, sugar 
refining, use of foreign-built yachts, mining, sales of securities, theatre tickets, gas-
oline, and luxuries generally, gifts, inheritances, narcotics, land deeds and other legal 
documents-these and numerous other things have been subjected to separate federal 
taxation.22 The Congressional choice of subjects is quite unlimited. 
But attack may be directed at the exemptions. Employers may urge that due 
process under the Fifth Amendment implies equal protection of the laws and that 
equality is denied by the exemption of employers mentioned in Section 8n. It is 
doubtful whether the Fifth Amendment is such a limitation upon the taxing power 
as to require even the rough approximations of equality required of state laws by 
the Fourteenth Amendment which expressly commands equal protection. The 
power of selection already discussed is a power to exempt. The difference is only in 
verbal statement. The subject of the tax may·be narrowly defined so as to exclude 
certain persons by negative implication or it may be defined more broadly with 
express exemption of the same persons sought to be excluded. There is no case in 
which such an attack upon a federal tax has been sustained or even encouraged.23 
19 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929). 
~pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6o1 (1895); Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 
255 U. S. 2_88 (1921); Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (1929). 
21 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra note 18. 
""Almost any general revenue act since the war provides abundant precedent for broad , Congressional 
discretion in the selection of,subjects for taxation. And see Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 171 (1796); Veazie 
Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 {U.S. 1869); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899); Thomas v. U. S., 192 
U.S. 363 (1904); Spr~ckles Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904); McCray v. U.S,, 195 
U.S. 27. {1904); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 {19n); Billings v. U.S., 232 U.S. 261 (1914); 
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929); cf. Edelman v. Boeing Air Transp., 289 U. S. 249 (1933); 
Fox v. Standard .Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87 (1935). The Court has sustained selection, for taxation, of anthra• 
cite coal from all other coal, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery. Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922), of herring from all 
other fish, Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44 (1921). 
23 On the contrary, the Court has discouraged such attacks: "Except in rare and special instances, the 
due process of law clause contained in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power 
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But even were it otherwise, the exemptions have ample justification. ( r) Exemption 
of employment by a state and its subdivisions is justified by constitutional limitations 
which are similarly operative on the general income tax. (2) A tax by the federal 
government on itself and its instrumentalities as employer will hardly be urged. 
(3) Exemption of religious, charitable and educational institutions has historic 
precedent and long tradition as justification, apart fr9m other considerations relating 
to this specific tax. (4) Likewise exemption of agricultural labor, domestic service 
and service performed by crews on vessels-simply because of their intrinsic differ-
ence from other employment-has sufficient precedent in past practice.24 And there 
are additional considerations. It would be strangely inconsistent, at least now, for 
the government to increase the tax burden on agriculture while it is at the same time 
searching for means to lift agriculture from its financial plight. The compensation 
of all three classes of employment consists largely of maintenance and only partly of 
money. Collection of the tax might cost more than the tax would bring. (5) The 
similar burden of expenditure and the annoyance to the taxpayer suffice to justify the 
exemption of casual labor. (6) Exemption of service performed by a person who is 
over 65 years of age may be rested on the desire not to afford additional encourage-
ment for the discharge of, or·refusal to employ, such persons, whose age alone puts 
them at a disadvantage. 
· These answers may also be made to the complaint that the employee's tax makes 
the same exemptions. But here there is the additional quite conclusive answer that 
the exempt employees are not given any benefits under, Title II of the Act. This is 
equally the response to the objection, that the tax is levied only on wage income-
apart from the additional fact that it has long been held that an income tax need not 
include income from all sources.25 
There are other minor objections of inequality. The taxes are not levied on 
wages over $3,000. An employer having one employee to whom he pays $6,ooo is 
taxed upon $3,ooo, while an employer liaving two employees throughout the year 
to each. of whom he pays $3,ooo or one employee for six mon~s.at $3,000 and a 
different employee for the other six months, also at $3,000, is taxed upon $6,ooo. An 
employee earning $6,ooo from one employer is taxed on $3,000 while an employee 
earning $3,ooo from each of two employees is taxed on $6,ooo. Such objections as-
sume that the due process clause is an especially sensitive instrument which can cut 
exceedingly fine. And they would turn attention away from major features to 
minutiae which are of little import~nce and which can be readily corrected if found 
conferred upon Congr~s by the Constitution." Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 44 (1934). See also 
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. I (1916) where objections to tax exemptions similar to those 
in the Social Security Act were held to be without substance. The federal taxes which have been declared 
unconstitutional under the due process clause have been only those which the Court deemed to be 
retroactive; note 16, supra. 
"'E.g., workmen's compensation acts, taxes on motor vehicles and gasoline. 
""Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra note 20; Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., supra note 
23; cf. Klein v. Board of Tax Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 (1930). 
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faulty. But each· of the objections may be met. The government, in need of 
revenue, niaY. well decide to broaden its tax base and avoid cumulation of taxes. The 
$,3;000 limitation may be the result of such an effort. Income above that amount is 
subject to the graduated income tax. The possible difference in the employers' tax 
which n+ay result fr~ differences in the number of employees to whom the same 
aggregate amount of wages is paid is the result, not of unequal, but of equal, treat-
ment. The tax is on the privilege of employment and the privilege is exercised to a 
greater extent when a greater number of employees are employed. The number of 
employees and the amount of wages paid are both reasonable measures for the tax.26 
As for ·the employee who pays a higher tax because he receives wages from two 
employers rather than one, a sufficient answer may be the practical difficulties of 
administration which would be involved if the employer's records could not form 
the basis for assessment and collection.27 "In another sense, moreover, there is 
equality." The income tax is an excise on being employed by another for wages. 
Two employments may, again, be regarded as a greater exercise of the privilege than 
one.28 Like the "numerous and minute, not to say in many respects hypercritical 
contentions" made in the Brushaber case, the objections here "rest upon the mistaken 
theory that although there be differences between the subjects taxed, to differently 
tax them transcends the limit of taxation and amounts to a want of due process."20 
"It is a sufficient answer to say that you cannot carry a constitution out! witlt math-
ematical nicety to logical extremes."80 
. TITLE II 
The scheme of ~e Act reflects the hope that the validity of the taxes might be 
determined without investigation of the expenditure of the funds collected. With 
the validity of the taxes thus determined, there would then be no one, in view of 
Frothingham v. Mellon, who could question before the courts the general validity 
of the appropriations and expenditures. But the A.A.A. decision has shaken the 
foundation for that hope. It is ~till true, of course, that there is no express tie-up 
20 Chain store taxes based on the number of stores, regardless of their revenues, have been upheld 
despite objection under the equal pro~cction clause. Sec Fox v. Standard Oil Co., ·supr~J note 22. Like· 
wise, with respect to the objection that an employer of one person at $3,000: pays a higher tax than an 
employer of two pers&ns at $r,ooo each, there is precedent in sales taxes ,generally. A purchaser of a 
$6o suit pays a higher tax than a purchaser of two $20 suits. And see Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 
124 (1929), where the gift tax was challenged because, by virtue of graduation and exemption, "the tax 
levied upon donors of the same total amounts may 'be affected by the size of the gifts to individual 
donees." The challenge was, of course, unsuccessful. License fees are frequently fixed at a flat ·sum 
without reference to the amount of business· done by licensees, or are graduated to a maximum which 
disregards differ.ences above a certain point. 
srN. Y. e:r rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907), involved a stamp tax of two cents on each 
hundred dollars of face value of stock for every sale or agreement to sell the same. The tax was chal· 
lenged under the due process clause because face value rather than actual value was the measure, Said 
the Court: "The inequality of the tax, so far as actual values are concerned, is manifest. But, here again 
equality in this sense has to yield to practical considerations and usage" (at p. 159). 
liB Cj. N.Y. e:r rel. Hatch v. Reardon, supra note 27. 
""Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U. S. I, 24, 26 (1916). 
10 Paddle v. New York, 2II U. S. 446, 450 (1908). 
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between the taxes leyied by Title VIII and the appropriations authorized by any 
other title of the Act. The taxes are not earmarked but go into the general funds 
of the government. The appropriations are to be made from the general funds. 
There is no exact or textual correspondence between the amounts of the appro-
priations and the amounts expected from the taxes. And there is no express 
dependence of one upon the other. The appropriations are authorized without 
reference to possible experience in the tax collection. 
It is generally charged, however, that there is at least a budgetary correspondence 
between Title II and Title VIII, that the taxes are imposed to balance the appro-
priations authorized so that the federal budget will not be distorted. Assume, there-
fore, that in its inquiry as to the validity of the taxes, the Court professes power to 
inquire also into the budget and is convinced that Title II is the sine qua non.and 
major justification for the ta.x. As stated previously, no amount of analysis or 
psychoanalysis of the Act can disclose any purpose for the tax other than that of 
raising revenue. Unlike tax acts previously declared unconstitutional, this Act is 
obviously intended to promote rather than retard the frequency of the subject taxed, 
to 'raise more and more rather. than less and less revenue. And unlike the A.A.A. 
expenditures, the Title II expenditures are to be made without requiring anybody, 
by way of contract or condition, to act or refrain from acting in any manner. There 
is no penalty, no regulation, no attempt to "purchase compliance,"-only a tax and 
an expemliture. The benefits are paid only to those aged who do not continue in 
employment. But they are neither coerced nor tempted by the Act to retire from 
service. The benefit payments are considerably smaller than wages. A person who 
chooses to remain in service after 65 receives his wages rather than benefits until he 
is retired. He prejudices in no way his right to benefits upon retirement, the amount 
of the monthly benefits, or the amount of the death payments. The provision is 
simply that an individual shall not be paid both benefits and wages for the same 
month. To regard this as a coercion or purchase of retirement comes close to 
regarding unemployment relief or poor relief as a coercion or purchase of unemploy-
ment or poverty. 
Is the appropriation one for the common defense and general welfare? In the 
A.A.A. case the Court concluded that the general welfare was sought to be promoted 
not by the simple donation of money but by the purchase with that money of 
restraints which Congress \vas otherwise unauthorized to impose. On the interpre-
tation of the general welfare clause, however, t!'le Court adopted unreservedly the 
so-called broad or Hamiltonian point of view that the power to authorize expend-
itures of public money is not confined in its objectives to the other enumerated 
powers of the federal government but may be exercised broadly for the promotion 
of the national general welfare. The Court expressly declined "to ascertain the scope 
of the phrase 'general welfare of the United States' of to determine whether an 
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appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it."31 The Court has undertaken 
to ascertain whether·a tax is, in its view, truly that or something else. But it has 
never undertaken to ascertain whether the object of an appropriation is, in its view, 
the general welfare. In a century and a half of history that issue has been left to the 
judgihe.nt of Congress. 
Unless one is to set himself up as an omniscient economist or sociologist with 
unerring prophetic wisdom, it must be conceded that there· is abundant support for 
the Congressional determination that the tax and expenditure will promote the con-
stitutional objectives. The Act operates throughout the United States on a universal 
phenomenon-advancing age. It promises to introduce for the American population 
as a whole a more certain income, a more continuous purchasing power, a more 
secure future. It is expected thus to promote general prosperity, avoid precipitate 
dips· of depression and foster our national commerce. And it is expected thus to 
. produce a healthier, more confident, more contented and more loyal citizenry-for 
common defense and general.welfare in war and in peace. Expenditures for a 
national monument at Gettysburg32 or for bonuses or pensions to ex-soldiers are 
hardly more closely related to the future common defense and general we,lfare. of 
the United States than expenditures for assurance of security to the national popula-
tion and for lightening the burden on the young generation to support the old. 
There is another close federal purpose-the purpose to protect the government 
finances. Under Tide I of the Act, the federal government has undertaken to aid 
the.states financially in the provision of relief for the needy aged. It. is quite clear 
that federal aid will be necessary and will be extended so long ~s the need for relief 
contin:ues. The constitutionality of federal expenditures for this purpose has already 
been discussed. As a practical matter, regardless of individual private opinion, those 
expenditures are constitutional and we can start with that as a datum. Whether 
such expenditures by the federal government will be required continuously or only 
in the recurrent periods of depression is not material for the present point. The 
fact is that the federal government is under a present and potential liability to pro-
vide large sums of money for the relief of the needy aged. Now the evidence is 
convincing that the numbers of aged and needy aged in our population will con-
standy increase for a considerable period in the future, and that the expenditures 
for relief to the needy aged will, for that reason and others, mount at a rapid rate. 
The financial burden on the federal government, therefore, threatens to b!! quite 
heavy. To ease that burden and provide against it by application to its source is one 
function of Tide II. In a large sense, it is a civilized substitute for an, old and now 
unsatisfactory system of relief. Insofar, then, as the Tide VIII taxes are provisions 
against anticipated federal obligations, they are the result of a typical and traditional 
exercise of the taxing power. 
81 56 Sup. Ct. ~t 320. 
""U. S. v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U. S. 668 (1896). 
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Of course, Title II is not limited to relief of the needy aged. A very substantial 
portion of the beneficiaries of Title II will be needy. Another portion would be 
needy but for the operation of the Act. Some probably will not and' would not bt: 
needy. Title II is not merely a palliative. It attempts to cure the condition and 
prevent its recurrence. It is a civilized measure precisely because it is focussed on the 
social problem rather than on the individual symptoms. And it is certainly wise 
statesmanship that a provision against future obligations should rely upon systematic, 
autofi?.atic administration and avoid the costs, the wastes, the dissatisfactions, the 
humiliations and the dangers of individual determinations of need. 
What has been said would seem to answer the possible objection that the Act 
invades the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Provision of 
the kind of benefits contemplated by Title II can hardly be regarded as' of merely 
local concern in view of our own recent history and the history of all other industrial 
countries. The national interest in the welfare of the national population is obvious. 
That the Act is calculated to promote that welfare is also clear. The issue is only 
whether the nation has power to enact the specific legislation in furtherance of that 
interest. National interest in the general welfare has been deemed insufficient to 
warrant coercive national regulation of local commerce, even though that regulation 
might promote the general welfare, because the national power to regulate com-
merce is limited to interstate commerce. But the criterion of the power to tax and 
appropriate is only the purpose to promote the general welfare. That power ex-
pressly conferred is, as the Chief Justice stated in the T.V .A. case, not abridged by 
the Tenth Amendment.33 Granted that Titles VIII and II only tax and appropriate, 
then they are within Congressional power. The A.A.A. case and its predecessors 
contain, as pointed out above, no warrant for a contrary holding. In all of them, the 
legislation "did more than tax and appropriate. 
The charge that while the tax is not a penalty or regulation it is still not a "true" 
tax but rather an "exaction" or "expropriation of money from one group for the 
benefit of another" in violation of the due process clause is largely unfounded in-
vective. It is difficult to think of the persons taxed under Title VIII and the persons 
entitled to benefits under Title II as different "groups." If the funds required 
under Title II were collected by means of some other general tax, a sales tax or the 
income tax, the charge could hardly be made. In a sense all taxes are exaction~ of 
money from one group for the benefit of another. No expenditure returns to the 
taxpayer direct benefits, or indirect benefits through the general welfare, exactly pro-
portioned to his tax payments. Tax money expended for soldiers' bonuses, for 
relief of the unemployed and the needy, and for pensions to Presidents' widows and 
civil servants is in direct form money exacted from one group for the benefit of 
another. In substance the case is no less clear with respect to the protective tariff and 
113 56 Sup. Ct. at 475: "To the extent that the power of disposition is thus expressly conferred, it is 
manifest that the Tenth Amendment is not applicable. And die Ninth Amendment ••• does not with-
draw the rights which are expressly granted to the federal government." 
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the taXes paid by that class of the population who smoke tobacco and drink liquor. 
Yet that is hardly expropriation. The legislative determination that the taxes and 
expenditures are for the general welfare is a determination that they are for the 
benefit of the taxpayers as well as the direct recipients of the expenditures. There is, 
and can be, no requirement that taxes or expenditures benefit all taxpayers in pre-
cisely the same manner or in degrees exactly proportioned to their taxes. The charge 
of "expropriation" raises no new issue even though it points to a psychological 
hazard. 
Similar is the charge that by Titles VIII and II the federal government has 
embarked upon the insurance business in competition with private enterprise. In 
point of fact, the statement is quite untrue. There is practically no private enterprise 
in the limited field in which these titles operate. And there is practically no prospect 
that private enterprise can or will occupy the .field. But legally, the charge even if 
true does not condemn. If competition with private enterprise is the consequence of 
an exercise of a power granted by the Constitution, then it is a conseql!ence permitted 
by the Constitution. The fact of competition with private enterprise was accorded 
no significance in the T.V.A. case because competition was the necessary consequence 
of the granted power to dispose of property properly acquired. Yet there the com-
petition was real and obvious. And the Court sanctioned a disposal of the property 
in not the least but in the most competitive manner. It sanctioned the purchase of 
transmission lines, as an incident of the power to dispose, in order to effect a more 
competitive disposal. Titles VIII and II do.nothing more than tax and give for the 
general welfare-powers admittedly granted to Congress. 
It may be said, however, that the .field is reserved for private enterprise regard-
less of "Zhether or not private enterprise has chosen to occupy it. But constitutional 
law does not define the kind of enterprises into which government may enter beyond 
prescribing that the taxation shall be for the "general welfare," or, as it is frequently 
put,, for a "public purpose." States and their subdivisions have been permitted to 
engage in a variety of enterprises under this limitation.34 The test is not rigid, but 
concerns itself with judgment as to need in each instance. It asks how great is the 
public need for the particular service; how: important to the life of the community is 
the service; how adequately or inadequately is it furnished by private enterprise; 
how extensively does the government propose to furnish it and how seriously does 
the government's activity interfere with private enterprise. What has already been 
said sufficiently answers these questions. For similar reasons the federal government 
is already in the banking business with its Land Banks and others and in the insur-
ance business under the War Risk Insurance Act. The alleged entry into and com-
petition with private business is a ghost having -no reality-but it is a ghost which 
may frighten, and fright may prompt unwise and unjustified action. 
One further point. If we look into the expenditures for the purpose of discover-
uSee, e.g., Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233 (1920); Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917). 
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ing possible grounds for invalidating the taxes, we should not neglect the evidence 
thus made available for rebuttal of objections to the taxes. The scheme of benefits 
provided in Title II, if considered in connection with Title VIII, affords independent 
answer to the objections of inequality and due process previously discussed. 
TITLE IX 
Much of what has been said about Title VIII is, of course, equally applicable to 
the tax imposed by Title IX. Thus, the questions as to the selection of the employ-
ment of others as the subject of the tax, the· exemption of certain employment and 
geographical uniformity need not be discussed again. The additional exemption of 
employers of less than eight employees should occasion no difficulty. Minor exercises 
of a privilege are commonly exempted from taxes on the privilege. The gift tax, 
the inheritance tax, the amusement tax all begin a little above the bottom, though 
the respective privileges are exercised when the gift or inheritance is below the 
taxable amount or the cost of the amusement cheaper. Likewise, the additional factor 
that credits upon the tax are allowed for payments under state laws and the state 
laws may vary, introduces no difficulty with respect to the requirement of uniformity. 
Geographical uniformity is still provided. The divergence is due not to the Act but 
to the uncontrolled distribution of the phenomena upon which the Act operates. 
Wherever the phenomenon occurs, the Act operates. Precisely similar divergence 
exists with reference to the credits and deductions for state tax payments allowed in 
the federal estate tax in the federal income tax. "Congress cannot accommodate 
its legislation to the conflicting or dissimilar laws of the several states nor· control 
the diverse ~onditions to be found in the various states which necessarily work unlike 
results from the enforcement of the same tax. All that the Constitution (Article I, 
Section 8, clause 1) requires is that th~ law still shall be wiiform in the sense that by 
the provisions the rule of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States."35 
The scheme of Title IX is modeled on the federal estate tax which passed muster 
before the Supreme Court in Florida v. Mellon.36 That tax may "bet credited with 
the amount of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes paid to any State," 
the credit not to exceed So per cent of the federal tax. The legislation was assailed 
on the ground that it constituted "an invasion .of the sovereign rights of the state 
and a direct effort on the part of Congress to coerce the state into imposing an 
inheritance tax and to penalize it and its property and citizens for the failure to do 
so." Said the Court: "The act assailed [Section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926] was 
passed by Congress in pursuance of its power to lay and collect taxes, and, following 
the decision of this court in respect of the preceding act of 1916} New York Trust 
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, must be held to be constitutional."37 
Prior to the 1926 Act the credit upon the federal estate tax allowed for state tax 
osFiorida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927). 
10 Supra note 32. tr Id. at 16, 17. 
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payments was not to exceed 25 per cent of the federal tax.88 At that time Florida, 
which had no inheritance tax, did not complain. It was still a favored ~md profitable 
state of domicile "for persons of large estates. Then Section 301 of the 1926 Act in-
creased the credit to 8o per cent. It was that increase that mad,e it insufficiently 
profitable for such persons to become domiciled in Florida. And it was that increased 
~redit which Florida challenged as being less an attempt to raise revenue and more 
an attempt to coerce non-inheritance-tax states to impose inheritance taxes, or at 
least to remove Florida's advantage as a prospective state of domicile over the states 
which did have inheritance taxes. The characterization seemed quite apt. Here 
was an attempt to raise revenue which would obviously result in reducing revenue 
by some 75 per cent. Yet the tax is constitutional. It produces some revenue. It 
reduces, by the credit and not necessarily by the increase in the credit, the burden 
"of cumulati:ve taxation. It recognizes state policy and preserves sources for state 
revenue, though frustrating another state policy lik~ that of Florida. It does not 
directly attempt to disc;ourage or coerce action by individuals. And it does not 
attempt or hope to discourage the frequency of the subject taxed. 
The legal form of Title IX is a faithful replica of its model. It, too, allows a 
credit only for money paid under compulsion of state law (except for the additional 
credit under Section 910, to be mentioned presently). It, too, will raise substantial 
.revenue, even if all t!}Xpayers become eligible for the credit. It hopes to encourage 
rather than discourage the frequency of the subject taxed. It, too,· is designed to 
~void cumulative "taxation and permit the execution of state policy. The additional 
credit allowed by Section 910 is but additional precaution against undue inter-
'ference with state poli1=y. If additional credit were not allowed, the Act would tend 
to proscribe a type of state unemployment compensation plan which is· already in 
existence (viz., _the "Wisconsin" or "employer reserve" plan) and ·for which there is a 
good deal of demand and promise. It would be quite paradoxical if such measures, 
enacted imder an express power and designed to protect the states in the execution 
of ~eir policies, were deemeo to be invasions of the states' powers. 
There are, however, some differences. Credit on the Title IX tax is allowed only 
for payment under such state laws as are found by the Social Security Board to 
comply with the conditions . enumerated in Section 903. The conditions concern 
solely the provisions of the state laws under which the state payments are made by 
the taxpayers and relate only to the administration and expenditure of the funds 
collected; .and the funds are required to be deposited in the Tr!!asury of the United 
States. The conditions are in large part similar to those discussed earlier with 
reference to the grants-in-aid. Granted the power to tax and the power to allow 
credits for payments under state laws, it is difficult to find substantial constitutional 
ground for denying to Congress choice as. to the kind of state laws that may qualify 
payments ior the credit. This is not a purchase of c?mpliance by individuals; the 
""Revenue Act of 1924, §301 (b), 43 STAT. 304. 
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choice is not theirs and they cannot comply. Nor is this less non-coercive upon the 
states than the common conditions in grants-in-aid or than the estate tax upon 
Florida. 
The further difference that most states had inheritanc;e taxes when the 1926 
Revenue Act was passed, while most-states had no unemployment compensation laws 
when the Social Security Act was passed seems similarly insignificant. The point 
suggested is, of course, that because of this difference the latter act is in fact coercive 
though the former is not. But coercion in fact cannot be so blithely established. It 
is commonly believed that many states would have had unemployment compensa-
tion laws were it not for the fear of competition from states without such laws. If 
that is the fact, then the former states have been awaiting the opportunity made 
available by Title IX. On the other hand, at the time of the enactment of the 
Revenue Act of 1926, or thereafter, there may have been states which desired to 
repeal or reduce their inheritance taxes but were deterred by that Act from doing 
so. Moreover, in almost all the states it became profitable to increase the inheritance 
taxes in order to take advantage of the increased credit. If the 1926 change is 
regarded, rather than the initial smaller credit, the suggested difference disappears. 
There is no coercion in either case, as there is also no coercion in tho grants-in-aid, 
because the same choice is provided. Congress may tax with an eye to the future as 
well as to the present. 
If the argument thus far has carried conviction, there is no need for going farther. 
But there may still lurk a suspicion that we cannot "shut our eyes" to the fact that 
the purpose of the tax is to procure unemployment compensation and that somehow 
that makes a difference. The suspicion raises with respect to the Title IX tax the 
same issues which have alreapy been discussed with respect to the Title VIII tax. 
Only little additional discussion is necessary. 
Suppose that the tax were professedly levied for the establishment of a federal 
unemployment compensation fund to be collected, administered and expended by 
the federal government. Would it be within the power of Congress to lay taxes 
to provide for the common defense and general welfare? Are federal expenditures 
for unemployment relief, expenditures for a federal purpose, the general welfare? 
The question deserves the emphasis of Chief Justice White's favorite reply: merely 
to ask the question is to provide the answer. In a period of severe criticism of 
federal policy and federal spending almost no one is heard to say that the present 
unemployment is not a national problem, that the federal government should not or 
cannot spend its moni~ for the relief of unemployment. There are differences-
sharp or fancied-as to methods, projects, amounts and procedures. But all seem to 
agree that the federal government may and must feel a responsibility and attempt 
to discharge it. If, then, unemployment is a national ill, its cure would be obviously 
for the general welfare and Congress, therefore, may appropriate money for that 
purpose. Whether payment of money to the unemployed will in fact tend to relieve 
HeinOnline  -- 3 Law & Contemp. Probs. 314 1936
,LAw AND CoNTEMPORARY PRoBLEMS 
the ills of unemployment and thus promote the general welfare is a matter for legis-
lative determination. But none will deny that the Congressional determination in 
the affirmative has abundant reasonable support. 
If the payment of money to the unemployed is a proper federal expenditure, then 
the federal government may levy taxes in preparation for the outlay. The Act would 
provide for no more than the collection of taxes and the payment of benefits. Both 
powers are in terms granted to the federal government. No substantial issue under 
the Tenth Amendment would be involved. Neither the Constitution nor the spirit 
of federalism commands that relief for the unemployed or the aged is a matter for 
state concern.39 When the distress is or threatens to be national in scope and relief 
is necessary for the national welfare, the matter is one for federal concern. And the 
federal concern is here translated into action, not through some prohibited power of 
regulation, but solely through the granted power to tax and appropriate. 
Nor would the due process clause present any serious obstacle. Concededly, the 
purpose of the tax would be to foster the general welfare. General welfare not 
simply because of the betterment of the lot of those unemployed for the time, but 
general welfare because of the stimulation or maintenance of industry and commerce 
through the greater stabilization of pUrchasing power. And general welfare by the 
prevention of demoralization and despondency and by the stimulation of confidence 
and loyalty in the populace, a federal concern, as pointed out above, in peace as well 
as war. 
If the purpose of Title IX is to provide unemployment compensation on the basis 
of state administration under federal supervision, it is but an alternative method for 
a nationally administered unemployment compensation plan. With the latter avail-
able, the choice of the former can hardly be regarded as an invasion of powers 
reserved to the states. With powei to supplant the states, Congress has instead 
invited them to precede. The wisdom of the choice has been discussed elsewhere. 
Its consistency with the spirit of federalism seems hardly open to question. At least, 
so it seems to me. 
150 The use of the word "concern" is not meant as an acceptance of a particular theory as to the mean· 
ing of the Tenth Amendment. The Constitution, it has been pointed out, speaks of powers; and it is 
powers, not fields, subjects, or concerns, that are reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. See 
Collier, supra note 3, at 224. There may be much significance in the difference.· But the present argu· 
ment is addressed to the judicial rather than the constitutional term. Cf. the opinion of the Chief Justice 
in the T.V.A. case (56 Sup. Ct. at 479): "The constitutional provision is silent as to the method of dis· 
posing of property belonging to the United States. That method, of course, must be an appropriate means 
of disposition according to the nature of the property, it must be one adopted in the public interest as 
distinguished from private or personal ends, and we may assume that it must be consistent with the 
foundation principles of our dual system of government and must not be contrived to govern the concerns 
reserved to the States." The Social Security Act satisfies these requirements. 
